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THE COURT'S NEW GIANT KILLER-THE "TENDENCY
TO MONOPOLY" CLAUSE
By ROBERT E. GREEN
Modern technology and new efficiency have bred in the United States
numerous giant corporations holding great power in our economy. These
corporations constitute a potential threat to the ideal of free competition.
It was not surprising, then, that the face of free competition began to show
wrinkles of worry when the giant of the chemical industry, E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., began to acquire stock in the giant of the automobile
industry, General Motors Corp. By 1919, the du Pont Corp. held 23% of
General Motors' stock, the largest single block of stock in this, the world's
largest corporation having what well may be the largest diversification and
distribution of stockholders of any corporation.1 Nevertheless, it was not
until 1949 that the Justice Department filed an action based on this acquisi-
tion. The complaint in that action alleged that the du Pont Company had
violated sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act2 and also section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act3 by substantially restraining trade in the automobile manufactur-
ers' market through restricting competition in the sale of certain products
manufactured by it to General Motors.
The District Court found in favor of the du Pont Company and its co-
defendants.4 The Supreme Court, per Brennan, J., reversed the decision of
the court below on the ground that the du Pont Company's ownership of
General Motors stock was tending to create a monopoly at the time of suit
in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.5 The applicable paragraph of
that section states:
"That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indi-
rectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition
may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose
stock is so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to re-
strain such commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce."6
Burton, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissented.
Questions Raised by the du Pont Case
The opinion of the court in the du Pont case raises two interesting ques-
tions with regard to this section of our anti-trust laws. First, does section 7
1 See United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 607, n. 36. On some
occasions at least, du Pont stock has been a majority at stockholders meetings. United States v.
E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235, 254 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended go Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
3 38 Stat. 731 (1914). This section was subsequently amended in 1950; 64 Stat. 1125 (1950),
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
4 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
5 353 U. S. 586 (1957).
6 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
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apply to cases of vertical integration, i.e. supplier-consumer mergers, or
only to cases of horizontal integration, i.e. mergers of competitors? Second
-and this is the vital issue-if section 7 does apply to vertical integrations,
does a violation occur if a tendency towards monopoly arises at any time
after the acquisition of the stock, i.e. at the time of suit, or must this ten-
dency exist at the time of and be collateral to the acquisition? The court's
answer was that section 7 did apply to vertical mergers which tended to
monopoly at the time of suit, the dissent disapproving both these conclu-
sions.
Vertical or Horizontal Integration
In 1950, Congress settled the first of these questions by determining
that thenceforth vertical integrations should fall within the purview of sec-
tion 7 7 However, this amendment is inapplicable to acquisitions occurring
prior to 1950.8 Since under the du Pont rule no time limit exists on how long
after the acquisition suit by the government under section 7 may be filed-
in the du Pont case thirty years had elapsed-suits based upon the many
vertical mergers which occurred between 1914 and 1950 will still raise the
problem as to their inclusion within section 7 as it stood at the time of the
du Pont decision.
The Federal Trade Commission, as the administrative organ charged
with enforcement of the anti-trust laws,9 has been consistently of the opin-
ion that section 7 as written in 1914 was not to be applied to vertical inte-
grations but only to horizontal mergers.' ° While it is true that administra-
tive interpretation is "a powerful indication" of statutory meaning," so
also are congressional committee reports where an ambiguity exists in a
statute.' 2 The report of the House Judiciary Committee on the 1950 amend-
ments to the Clayton Act, on which the FTC relied in its 1955 Report on
Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions," stated, however, that it was only
"some" who thought section 7 to be inapplicable to vertical integration and
that Congress now intended to "make it clear" that the section was so appli-
cable.14 The FTC, then, appears to be includable among the "some" but
not necessarily in agreement with Congress.
Basically, of course, the question is not Congress' interpretation in
1949, but Congress' intent in 1914. However, any expectation of assistance
on this point from the 1914 congressional committee reports on the pro-
7 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952); see H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
11 (1949).
864 Stat. 1126 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1952).
9 Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721 (1914), 15 U.S.C. 46 (1952).
10 FTC ANN. REP. 60 (1929) ; FTC, REPORT ON CORPORATE MERGERS AN AcQu-srioNs,
H.R. Doc. No. 169, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1955).
11 FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 352 (1941).
12 Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 31 (1934) ; Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,
474 (1921).
13 Supra note 10.
14 H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1949).
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posed Clayton Act is doomed to disappointment. The House report informs
us only that the purpose of section 7 was abolition of the holding company"'
and the term, "holding company," is as applicable to vertical as to horizon-
tal control. The only other contemporary congressional history is Senator
Reed's interpretation that section 7 did not prohibit a consumer from con-
trolling a supplier. 6 Even if this is acceptable evidence of statutory mean-
ing, 7 control of consumer by supplier is distinguishable from control of
supplier by consumer since the aim in the latter is only to insure a supply
of raw materials while in the former it is to obtain monopoly control of the
consumer's market.
However, if we examine the language of section 7, it appears question-
able if any ambiguity in fact exists. An acquisition becomes unlawful under
section 7 only where it may result in any one of three "effects": 1) a sub-
stantial lessening of competition between the corporation whose stock is
acquired and the corporation making the acquisition; 2) a restraint of
commerce in any section or community; or 3) a tendency to create a mo-
nopoly in any line of commerce.'8 The first does involve a lessening of com-
petition "between" the acquiring and acquired corporations; contrastingly,
no such language limits the second or third conditions, but rather broad
terms are there employed--"in any section or community," "of any line of
commerce." These phrases clearly indicate a violation does not only involve
an "effect" affecting two corporations but also involves an "effect" affecting
an area of commerce. Such an "effect," i.e. a tendency to monopoly, unques-
tionably could occur in an area or line of commerce as a result of a trans-
action not involving competing corporations. As was said in Aluminum Co.
of America v. FTC:
"A monopoly can be created by a transaction of stock acquisition where
the effect is not to lessen competition with the corporation whose stock is
acquired if the effect is to end competition elsewhere .... This is for the
reason that the lessening of competition and a tendency to monopoly are
not always synonomous."' 9
In at least two cases, District Courts have found violations of section 7
where the acquisition was not of a corporation competing with the acquir-
ing corporation. In United States v. New England Fish Exchange,20 a ten-
dency to monopoly was discovered where a number of competing corpora-
tions had been acquired by two corporations competing between themselves
but not in competition with the acquired corporations. This latter fact was
apparently overlooked by Justice Burton in his attempt to distinguish this
15 H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 17 (1914).
Is51 Cong. Rec. 14455 (1914).
17See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, supra note 12.
Is See Western Meat Co. v. FTC, 1 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir., 1924), rood. and aff'd. 272 U.S.
554 (1926) ; Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 406 (3rd Cir., 1922), cert. denied,
261 U.S. 616 (1923).
19 Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, supra note 18.
20258 Fed. 732 (D. Mass., 1919).
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case. In Ronald Fabrics Co. v. Verney Brunswick Mills, Inc.,21 section 7
was expressly applied to a case where the defendant consuhier acquired the
stock of its and the plaintiff's supplier. The dissent correctly states that the
Ronald Fabrics opinion does not bind the Supreme Court, but this opinion
together with the New England Fish case does illustrate an agreement on
the applicability of section 7 to vertical mergers among those courts having
considered it prior to the Supreme Court.
As supporting the view that section 7 is not so applicable to vertical
integrations, Justice Burton in his dissent cites International Shoe Co. v
FTC' and Thatcher Mfg. Co. v. FTC.' But in both those cases, the Su-
preme Court found only that the corporations involved were not in compe-
tition, thus ruling out any violation of the first prohibited effect, i.e. a less-
ening of competition between the acquiring and acquired corporations.
Neither case considered the tendency to monopoly provision, the only ele-
ment of section 7 involved in the du Pont case.
On the other hand, in Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co.,24
the Court found that a "[tendency] to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce" in violation of section 2 of the Clayton Act3" (prohibiting price
discrimination, inter alia, tending to create a monopoly) had occurred even
though the violating corporation was not in the same line of commerce. If
we apply the same interpretation to the words in section 7, "tendency to
create a monopoly," this phrase will be applicable to any situation involving
the acquisition by one corporation of the stock of another corporation
though not in the same line of commerce and thus not competing.
There would seem to be no objection from the courts, then, to applying
section 7 to vertical mergers tending to monopoly. The words of the section
expressly limit the applicability of the first "effect" to acquisitions between
competing corporations but there is no reason to imply the same restraint
to the "tendency to monopoly" clause where no limiting words appear and
in no case have the courts so done. A tendency to monopoly may as well
exist where a supplier such as the du Pont company controls the market of
an unusually large consumer as in the case of a merger of two large con-
sumers; the elimination of competition is as possible in the one situation as
in the other and it is this our anti-trust laws, including section 7, seek to
prevent.
Time of Tendency to Monopoly
The second issue presented by the court's opinion is the time at which a
tendency to monopoly must exist in order to violate section 7.
The first point to note is that the tendency to monopoly need not ever
exist as an actual fact. The statute provides that
211946 CCH Trade Regulation Service para. 57, 514 (S.D. N.Y.).
22 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
2 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
24 278 U.S. 245 (1929).
25 Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730.
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.... no corporation... shall acquire... the stock of another corporation
... where the effect of such acquisition may be to.. .tend to create a
monopoly..." (Emphasis added.)26
The court considers the words, "the effect... may be to ... tend to create
a monopoly.. Y" to mean that there exists a "reasonable probability" of a
tendency to monopoly-a holding with which Justice Burton concurs and
which is well supported. The difference between the majority and the dis-
senters relates to the time at which this "reasonable probability" must exist.
Is that time the time of the acquisition, as the minority contends, or any-
time thereafter, i.e. the time of suit, as the majority maintains? The effect
of the majority's interpretation of section 7 is to place no time limit on the
section's applicability with the result that a corporation may be held guilty
of a violation of the section regardless of when the tendency to monopoly
arises with reference to the acquisition.
It is to be noted that the prohibition of section 7 is directed not against
a tendency to monopoly as such but rather against an acquisition giving
rise to a reasonable probability of the occurrence of that result. The court
construes "acquire" as equivalent to "hold." The two words, however,
clearly are entirely different in their meaning. To acquire means to get or
obtain as one's own; 21 to hold means to retain or maintain possession of. 2
"I... T]o hold rarely or never signifies the first act of seizing or falling on,
but the act of retaining a thing when seized on or confined.' "29
Thus, the reference of "acquire" is to a specific act occurring at a specific
time, viz. the time of obtaining or acquiring the stock, in contrast to "hold"
which refers to a continuing act. It is well established that since the words
here involved are not technical,
"'Ithe legislature must be presumed to use words in their known and ordi-
nary signification.' Levy's Lessee v. McCartee, 6 Pet. 102, 110. 'The popu-
lar or received import of words furnishes the general rule for the interpre-
tation of public laws.' Maillard v. Lawrence, 16 How. 251, 261." 30
In stating that "No corporation shall acquire.., the stock.., of another
corporation" etc., section 7, then must be taken to mean that no corporation
shall obtain such stock, not that no corporation shall hold such stock. The
only purpose of the "effect" clause is to state in what circumstances the ac-
quisition will be unlawful. The acquisition itself is the prohibited event but
only when, at that time, it appears reasonably probable to the trier of the
2638 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1946).
27 Helvering v. San Joaquin Fruit & Investment Co., 297 U.S. 496, 499 (1936) ; Wulzen v.
Board of Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15, 25, 35 Pac. 353, 356 (1894) ; WEBSTE'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DZcToARY (2nd ed. 1946).
2 Jack v. Walker, 79 Fed. 138, 140 (C.C.S.D. Ohio, 1897) ; State v. Nolte, 352 Mo. 1069,
180 S.W. 2d 740, 741 (1944); WEBSTERS NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2nd ed., 1946).
2 Griffin's Case, 11 Fed. Cas. No. 5815, at 24 (C.C.). Va., 1869), quoting Webster.
3 0Old Colony R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
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facts that a tendency to monopoly will occur.31 The court cannot impose
its own meaning on statutory provisions the language of which is clear;
rather,
"... where the language of the act is unambiguous and explicit, courts are
bound to seek the act itself, and they are not at liberty to suppose that the
legislature intended any thing different from what their language im-
ports."'3 2 "It is our judicial function to apply statutes on the basis of what
Congress has written, not what Congress might have written."33
The Court justifies its interpretation on the ground that the Clayton Act
was intended to arrest monopolies in their incipiency.3 4 It then states that
"incipiency" refers not to acquisition but to the effect of a tendency to
monopoly and thus the prohibition of section 7 becomes effective at any
time the effect becomes incipient, citing Transamerica Corp. v. Board of
Governors.3 5 That case involved the second paragraph of section 7 which
prohibits stock acquisitions of two or more corporations where the effect
may be a lessening of competition among such corporations, a restraint of
commerce or a tendency to monopoly. The facts were that Transamerica, a
bank holding company, had acquired a number of independent banks over
a considerable period of time thus allegedly lessening competition. The
complaint was based on all of these acquisitions up to the time of the suit.
In contrast, the du Pont case involved but a single acquisition of a single
corporation long before commencement of the suit. The cases are thus in
no way analogous on this point. The idea of incipiency, of beginning," is in
no way inconsistent with the construction of section 7 suggested above and
indeed conforms to the idea of attaching to the acquisition, the beginning of
the transaction.
Nor does the construction here proposed limit the scope of the anti-trust
laws, as is contended by the majority. The Clayton Act was not intended
to be all-inclusive but rather was designed to supplement the Sherman
Act.3 7 Section 1 of that Act prohibits any combination or conspiracy in re-
straint of trade; section 2 prohibits any monopoly or attempt to monopo-
lize.38 The Sherman Act, then, becomes effective whenever a monopoly or
attempt to monopoly comes into existence. The Clayton Act, on the other
hand, was intended to prevent their existence. 9 With regard to section 7,
this was to be accomplished by stopping any acquisition which reasonably
probably tended to that result. If at the time of acquisition, the reasonable
31 Compare Aluminum Co. of America v. FTC, 284 Fed. 401, 407 (3rd Cir. 1922), cert.
denied, 261 U.S. 616 (1923).
32 New Lamp Chimney Co. v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 91 U.S. 656, 663 (1875).
33 United States v. Great Northern R. Co., 343 U.S. 562, 575 (1952).
34 See S. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
85 206 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 901 (1953).86 WEBESTER's NEW INTEIRNATiONA.L DIcTIoNARY (2nd ed. 1946).
37 See S. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1914) ; Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-
Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355 (1922).
3826 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1952).
39 See S. Rep. No. 698, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
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probability of a power to exclude competition was not foreseeable but sub-
sequently did arise, the Sherman Act was adequate to deal with it. But if it
could be foreseen as reasonably probable, then it would be stopped at what
indeed was its incipiency.
This proposed interpretation is also in accord with that public policy
which limits the time in which causes of action will be allowed. While the
Clayton Act is not limited by any statute of limitations, and the dissent ad-
mits doubt as to the applicability of the doctrine of laches, nevertheless
statutes are to be reasonably interpreted. To say that a corporation will
never know whether an acquisition of stock in another corporation inno-
cently made is unlawful, until such time thereafter as the government and
the courts determine such to have resulted, would appear to be at best ap-
proaching the bounds of reasonableness.
Indeed, the court's interpretation of section 7 does raise a question as
to the section's constitutionality. Due process requires that a person be
given notice that his act will be criminal before he does that act. With re-
gard to this requirement, the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice War-
ren, has said,
"The Constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by statute. The underlying principle
is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he
could not reasonably understand to be proscribed." 40
Can it be said that a corporation is given fair notice that it is committing a
crime in acquiring the stock of another corporation where, under the ma-
jority opinion in the du Pont case, it will not know if its conduct is forbid-
den by statute until some indefinite time after it has acted and that the
time when suit is commenced against it? True, the corporation knows that
its acquisition will be criminal if any tendency to monopoly arises, but this
event, under the court's interpretation, need not be foreseeable at that time
and thus the corporation has no way of knowing before it acts if it acts
unlawfully. It would thus seem that as so interpreted the statute deprives
the corporation of a basic element of due process.
Conclusion
It would appear, therefore, that the correct and reasonable interpreta-
tion of section 7 is that adopted by the dissenting Justices, specifically that
section 7 prohibits the acquisition of the stock of another corporation where
at that time it appears reasonably probable that there exists a tendency to
monopoly.
Whether a tendency to monopoly was reasonably foreseeable in 1917
as a result of the du Pont Company's acquisition or, indeed whether such
40 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1953).
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tendency to monopoly has existed at all during the thirty years intervening
between that time and the time of suit is a question of fact and too involved
a question to be considered here.4 But it does seem reasonable to suppose
that if any tendency to monopoly was to appear, it would have matured to
some extent by the time the government saw fit to bring this suit. In that
case, the situation would fall, however, within the scope of section 2 of the
Sherman Act, for a monopoly requires not the act of excluding competition,
but only the power to so do.42
The court, though it considers the whole thirty years of evidence in
determining its answer, avoids the specificity required to find a monopoly
or attempt to monopoly and latches on to the amorphism of section 7's "ten-
dency to monopoly." By misconstruing the language and the context of its
origin, it expands the section's scope so as to make an event perfectly legal
at the time a potential crime even after the dust has long been settled. The
du Pont decision will thus take its place as another of the present court's
sociological decisions supported by what appears to be a strained and in-
correct legal analysis.
41 The record in the trial court covers some eight thousand pages; the District Court
opinion requires another one hundred pages.
42 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
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